Methods for calculating cartel damages: A survey
AbstractThe paper focuses on the various methods used to quantify cartel damages, which have become more and more important as private damage suits in the aftermath of antitrust litigation increase. The approaches implementation is embedded into current legal environments with regards to the estimation approaches being used for quantification of cartel damages. The direct comparison of methods shows that difference methods convince due to their simplicity and plausibility in results as well as replicability. Cost-based approaches have to overcome hurdles but still are easy to conduct and comparatively more accurate. In contrast, price prediction takes market changes into account and the market simulation presents the most sophisticated and flexible approach, provided that assumptions are correct and correctly implemented, and therefore approaches the real world counterfactual as approximate as possible. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics in its series Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers with number 83.
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
cartels; damages; antitrust policy; public enforcement; private enforcement;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C10 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - General
- C15 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Statistical Simulation Methods: General
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
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