Coase Contracts and the Producer's Incentive to Innovate
AbstractThe paper analyzes the dynamic efficiency of the Coase solution to the problem of negative externalities. We demonstrate that with respect to the incentive of the producer to develop or to adopt a superior technology the so-called "symmetry thesis" does not hold for all types of contracts.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by TU Bergakademie Freiberg, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration in its series Freiberg Working Papers with number 1998,05.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
EXTERNALITIES ; CONTRACTS;
Other versions of this item:
- Fritsch, M. & Wein, T., 1998. "Coase Contracts and the Producer's Incentive to Innovate," Papers 98/5, Bergakademie Freiberg, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- K30 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - General
- O30 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - General
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