Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Informationsaustausch und trotzdem Wettbewerb? Unternehmensverhalten bei Nachfrageunsicherheit


Author Info

  • Hornig, Stephan O.
Registered author(s):


    Unternehmen müssen nicht immer Kollusionsabsichten verfolgen, wenn sie untereinander Informationen austauschen. Dieser Beitrag zeigt, daß bei Nachfrageunsicherheit auch strikt kompetitive Konkurrenten private Informationen bezüglich ihrer Nachfragebedingungen preisgeben. Dies läßt sich in einem allgemeinen heterogenen Oligopolmodell ableiten, auf dessen erster Stufe sich die Unternehmen für den optimalen Umfang des Informationsaustauschs entscheiden, um anschließend auf der zweiten Stufe oligopolistischen Wettbewerb zu betreiben. Im Bayesianischen Gleichgewicht resultieren eindeutige Gleichgewichtsstrategien. Diese sind durch die Art des auf dem betreffenden Markt herrschenden Wettbewerbs (Mengen- oder Preiswettbewerb) und durch die Eigenschaften der produzierten Güter (Substitute oder Komplemente) bestimmt. -- Information exchange between firms not necessarily pursues collusion purposes. It is shown that with demand uncertainty even competitively behaving firms reveal private information concerning their demand conditions. This is derived in a general model of a heterogeneous oligopoly where the firms decide on their optimal range of information exchange in the first stage and in the second they compete in their oligopolistic market. The Bayesian equilibrium is characterised by a dominant strategy for each firm. It is determined by the nature of competition (price or quantity) and by the basic characteristics of the goods produced (substitutes or complements).

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics in its series Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge with number 160.

    as in new window
    Date of creation: 1999
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuedps:160

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Keplerstr. 17, 72074 Tübingen
    Phone: 07071/29-72563
    Fax: 07071/29-5179
    Web page:
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research


    Find related papers by JEL classification:


    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Stadler, Manfred & Hornig, Stephan O., 2000. "Wettbewerb bei unvollständiger Information: Informationsaustausch oder stillschweigende Kollusion?," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics 177, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.
    2. Stadler, Manfred & Wapler, Rüdiger, 2001. "Endogenous skilled-biased technological change and matching unemployment," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics 220, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.
    3. Stadler, Manfred, 2003. "Innovation and growth: The role of labor-force qualification," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics 255, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.


    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.


    Access and download statistics


    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:tuedps:160. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.