A full participation agreement on global emission reduction through strategic investments in R&D
AbstractIf an emission reduction agreement with participation of all players is not enforceable because politicians are too myopic or not able to commit themselves to sustainable policies or costs of reducing emissions are too high, strategic investments in research and development (R&D) of green technology, for example sustainable drive-trains, can pave the way for a future treaty. Although no player will rationally reduce emissions on its own, investments in R&D by at least one player can change the strategic situation of negotiations to control emissions: Emission abatement costs will decrease so that a treaty with full participation can be achieved in future periods through time consistent sustainable policies. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Technische Universität Braunschweig, Economics Department in its series Economics Department Working Paper Series with number 10.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
emissions; discount factor; commitment; endogenous technical change; repeated prisoner's dilemma;
Other versions of this item:
- Kratzsch, Uwe & Sieg, Gernot & Stegemann, Ulrike, 2010. "A full participation agreement on global emission reduction through strategic investments in R & D," MPRA Paper 27188, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters
- F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
- O30 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - General
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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