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Privatization and liberalization in vertically linked markets

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Author Info
Stähler, Frank
Traub, Stefan

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Abstract

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are often vertically integrated firms which operate in key industries like transport, telecommunication and power generation. They provide an infrastructure and invest in its quality. We discuss the effects of liberalization and their privatization which can be complete or partial such that upstream production is still run by an SOE. We show that granting a downstream rival access to the infrastructure of a vertically integrated private firm is welfare improving in most cases even if a holdup problem exists. For any vertically separated structure we find that privatization through multi-product firms welfare dominates privatization through single-product firms. ; Öffentliche Unternehmen (SOEs) sind häufig als vertikal integrierte Unternehmen in bedeutenden Industrien wie Transportwesen, Telekommunikation und Stromversorgung tätig. Sie stellen eine Infrastruktur bereit und investieren in deren Qualität. Wir diskutieren die Effekte von Liberalisierung und Privatisierung, wobei die Privatisierung vollständig oder nur partiell vorgenommen werden kann, so dass die vorgelagerte Produktionsstufe weiterhin durch ein SOE betrieben wird. Wir zeigen, dass es die Wohlfahrt steigernd ist, wenn auf der nachgelagerten Stufe Konkurrenten eines privatisierten vertikal integrierten Unternehmen der Zugriff auf die Infrastruktur gestattet wird. Dies gilt in den meisten Fällen auch trotz eines Holdup-Problems für den Betreiber der Infrastruktur. Im Falle vertikaler Trennung ergibt sich, dass die Privatisierung in Mehr-Produkt-Unternehmen der Privatisierung in Ein-Produkt-Unternehmen wohlfahrtsmäßig überlegen ist. --

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Bremen, Collaborative Research Center 597: Transformations of the State in its series TranState Working Papers with number 95.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:sfb597:95

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Web page: http://www.sfb597.uni-bremen.de/

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Related research
Keywords: Privatization; vertical integration; state-owned enterprises;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Boundaries of Public and Private Enterprise; Privatization; Contracting Out
L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.


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