IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/sfb597/127.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

1. Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit. 2. International Regulation without International Government: Improving IO Performance through Orchestration

Author

Listed:
  • Abbott, Kenneth W.
  • Snidal, Duncan

Abstract

1. A new kind of international regulatory system is spontaneously arising out of the failure of international 'Old Governance' (i.e., treaties and intergovernmental organizations) to adequately regulate international business. Nongovernmental organizations, business firms, and other actors, singly and in novel combinations, are creating innovative institutions to apply transnational norms to business. These institutions are predominantly private and operate through voluntary standards. The Authors depict the diversity of these new regulatory institutions on the 'Governance Triangle,' according to the roles of different actors in their operations. To analyze this complex system, we adapt the domestic 'New Governance' model of regulation to the international setting. 'Transnational New Governance' potentially provides many benefits of New Governance and is particularly suitable for international regulation because it demands less of states and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). However, Transnational New Governance does require states and IGOs to act as orchestrators of the international regulatory system, and that system currently suffers from a significant orchestration deficit. If states and IGOs expanded 'directive' and especially 'facilitative' orchestration of the Transnational New Governance system, they could strengthen high-quality private regulatory standards, improve the international regulatory system, and better achieve their own regulatory goals. 2. International organizations (IOs) have been widely criticized as ineffective. Yet scholars and practitioners assessing IO performance frequently focus on traditional modes of governance such as treaties and inter-state dispute-resolution mechanisms. When they observe poor performance, moreover, they often prescribe a strengthening of those same activities. We call this reliance on traditional state-based mechanisms 'International Old Governance' (IOG). A better way to understand and improve IO performance is to consider the full range of ways in which IOs can and do operate - including, increasingly, by reaching out to private actors and institutions, collaborating with them, and supporting and shaping their activities. Such actions are helping to develop an intricate global network of public, private and mixed institutions and norms, partially orchestrated by IOs, that we call 'Transnational New Governance' (TNG). With proper orchestration by IOs, TNG can ameliorate both 'state failure' - the inadequacies of IOG - and 'market failure' - the problems that result when the creation and evolution of norm-setting institutions is highly decentralized. Orchestration thus provides a significant way for IOs to improve their regulatory performance. Some IOs already engage actively with private actors and institutions - we provide a range of illustrations, highlighting the activities of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). Yet there remains a significant 'orchestration deficit' that provides real opportunities for IOs. We draw on the lessons of existing IO activities to suggest additional possibilities for improving IO performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Abbott, Kenneth W. & Snidal, Duncan, 2010. "1. Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit. 2. International Regulation without International Government: Improving IO Perform," TranState Working Papers 127, University of Bremen, Collaborative Research Center 597: Transformations of the State.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:sfb597:127
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/41589/1/635597918.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Braithwaite, John, 2006. "Responsive regulation and developing economies," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 884-898, May.
    2. Prakash,Aseem & Potoski,Matthew, 2006. "The Voluntary Environmentalists," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521677721.
    3. Prakash,Aseem & Potoski,Matthew, 2006. "The Voluntary Environmentalists," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521860413.
    4. Graham, David & Woods, Ngaire, 2006. "Making corporate self-regulation effective in developing countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 868-883, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gorwa, Robert, 2019. "The platform governance triangle: conceptualising the informal regulation of online content," SocArXiv tgnrj, Center for Open Science.
    2. Gorwa, Robert, 2019. "The platform governance triangle: conceptualising the informal regulation of online content," Internet Policy Review: Journal on Internet Regulation, Alexander von Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society (HIIG), Berlin, vol. 8(2), pages 1-22.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Johannes Urpelainen, 2011. "Frontrunners and Laggards: The Strategy of Environmental Regulation under Uncertainty," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 50(3), pages 325-346, November.
    2. Oliver Westerwinter, 2021. "Transnational public-private governance initiatives in world politics: Introducing a new dataset," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 137-174, January.
    3. Rebecca Edwards & Graham Smith & Milena Büchs, 2013. "Environmental Management Systems and the Third Sector: Exploring Weak Adoption in the UK," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 31(1), pages 119-133, February.
    4. Holtmaat, Ellen Alexandra & Adolph, Christopher & Prakash, Aseem, 2020. "The global diffusion of environmental clubs: how pressure from importing countries supports the chemical industry's Responsible Care® program," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 102658, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, 2010. "International regulation without international government: Improving IO performance through orchestration," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 315-344, September.
    6. Bullock Graham, 2015. "Signaling the credibility of private actors as public agents: transparency, independence, and expertise in environmental evaluations of products and companies," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(2), pages 177-219, August.
    7. Büthe Tim, 2010. "Private Regulation in the Global Economy: A (P)Review," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(3), pages 1-40, October.
    8. Seong‐gin Moon, 2008. "Corporate Environmental Behaviors in Voluntary Programs: Does Timing Matter?," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1102-1120, December.
    9. Hoang, Phi Cong & McGuire, William & Prakash, Aseem, 2018. "Reducing Toxic Chemical Pollution in Response to Multiple Information Signals: The 33/50 Voluntary Program and Toxicity Disclosures," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 193-202.
    10. Mark Anthony Camilleri, 2022. "The rationale for ISO 14001 certification: A systematic review and a cost–benefit analysis," Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 29(4), pages 1067-1083, July.
    11. Mary Gugerty, 2009. "Signaling virtue: voluntary accountability programs among nonprofit organizations," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 42(3), pages 243-273, August.
    12. Bui, Linda T.M. & Kapon, Samuel, 2012. "The impact of voluntary programs on polluting behavior: Evidence from pollution prevention programs and toxic releases," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 31-44.
    13. Richard W. Carney & Sadok El Ghoul & Omrane Guedhami & Jane W. Lu & He Wang, 2022. "Political corporate social responsibility: The role of deliberative capacity," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 53(8), pages 1766-1784, October.
    14. Aseem Prakash & Matthew Potoski, 2016. "Dysfunctional institutions? Toward a New Agenda in Governance Studies," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 10(2), pages 115-125, June.
    15. Bu, Maoliang & Qiao, Zhenzi & Liu, Beibei, 2020. "Voluntary environmental regulation and firm innovation in China," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 10-18.
    16. Zhenyu Jiang & Zongjun Wang & Yanqi Zeng, 2020. "Can voluntary environmental regulation promote corporate technological innovation?," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 390-406, February.
    17. Lily Hsueh, 2020. "Expanding the multiple streams framework to explain the formation of diverse voluntary programs: evidence from US toxic chemical use policy," Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences, Springer;Association of Environmental Studies and Sciences, vol. 10(2), pages 111-123, June.
    18. Andreas Rasche & Frank Bakker & Jeremy Moon, 2013. "Complete and Partial Organizing for Corporate Social Responsibility," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 115(4), pages 651-663, July.
    19. Baron, David P., 2011. "Credence attributes, voluntary organizations, and social pressure," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1331-1338.
    20. Lily Hsueh & Aseem Prakash, 2012. "Incentivizing self‐regulation: Federal vs. state‐level voluntary programs in US climate change policies," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(4), pages 445-473, December.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:sfb597:127. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/zesbrde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.