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An experimental analysis of equal punishment games

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  • Ahlert, Marlies
  • Crüger, Arwed
  • Güth, Werner

Abstract

In equal punishment games first the proposer suggests how to split the pie, i.e. a positive monetary reward. Unlike in the ultimatum game, the responder can decide among many (for proposer and responder) equal penalty payments. To exclude negative payoffs, punishment was bounded from above depending on the proposal and the (for proposer and responder) same show up-fee, our only treatment variable. Although inequality aversion (Bolton and Oekenfels, 1999, and Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) predicts zero-punishments, we observe positive punishments which, however, became smaller in the repetition. Initial fairness is often substituted in the repetition by extreme greed. Whereas greed is sticky, fairness is more characteristic for initial inclinations and not a stable behavioral pattern.

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  • Ahlert, Marlies & Crüger, Arwed & Güth, Werner, 1999. "An experimental analysis of equal punishment games," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1999,73, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:sfb373:199973
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    Cited by:

    1. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, "undated". "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications," IEW - Working Papers 075, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    2. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2005. "The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 66, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    3. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2001. "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity," Discussion Papers in Economics 14, University of Munich, Department of Economics.

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