The quality of the signal matters - A note on imperfect observability and the timing of moves
AbstractIn a recent study Huck and MÃ¼ller (1998) report that--in contrast to Bagwell's (1995) prediction--first movers in a simple experimental market do not lose their commitment power in the presence of noise. The present note shows that it is the quality of the signal and not the knowledge about the physical timing of moves that is responsible for these experimental results. Additionally, the findings reported here provide further evidence that the positional order protocol cannot induce non--equilibrium play.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes in its series SFB 373 Discussion Papers with number 1999,17.
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Muller, Wieland, 2001. "The quality of the signal matters -- a note on imperfect observability and the timing of moves," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 99-106, May.
- Wieland Müller, 1999. "The quality of the signal matters - A note on imperfect observability and the timing of moves," Experimental 9902001, EconWPA.
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
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- Guth, Werner & Muller, Wieland & Spiegel, Yossi, 2006.
"Noisy leadership: An experimental approach,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 37-62, October.
- Wieland Müller & Yossi Spiegel & Werner Güth, . "Noisy leadership: An experimental approach," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-10, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Güth, W. & Müller, W. & Spiegel, Y., 2006. "Noisy leadership: An experimental approach," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-193643, Tilburg University.
- Hildenbrand, Andreas, 2010. "Cournot or Stackelberg competition? A survey on experimental evidence," MPRA Paper 24468, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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