IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/mpifgd/p0067.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Loyalty and Power in Union-Party Alliances: Labor Politics in Postcommunism

Author

Listed:
  • Avdagic, Sabina

Abstract

Against the background of the changing relationships between trade unions and political parties in Western Europe, this paper examines the nature and outcomes of union-party alliances in East Central Europe. The paper advances two interrelated arguments. First, the nature of union-party ties in postcommunism is significantly different and can be best described as an inverse dependency relationship in which political parties have always been the stronger partner. Second, contrary to the conventional assumptions based on the experience of Western Europe, strong union-party ties have worked to the detriment of labor in East Central Europe. This paradox is explained by poor reserves of loyalty, which are a direct consequence of the absence of a long history of close ties and mutually beneficial exchanges. The way in which such new alliances respond to economic imperatives is not likely to be affected by commitment concerns, but rather by the balance of power in the relationship. Given the fact that the balance of power is tilted towards parties, disloyal behavior is more likely to occur on the side of political parties than on that of the unions. In particular, in the context of pervasive economic constraints and limited party competition over economic policy issues, strong ties with the unions increase parties? incentives to coopt union leaders in the task of communicating the necessity of reforms to their constituencies.

Suggested Citation

  • Avdagic, Sabina, 2004. "Loyalty and Power in Union-Party Alliances: Labor Politics in Postcommunism," MPIfG Discussion Paper 04/7, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgd:p0067
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/19909/1/dp04-7.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John T. Addison & Claus Schnabel (ed.), 2003. "International Handbook of Trade Unions," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2705.
    2. Enderlein, Henrik, 2004. "Nationale Wirtschaftspolitik in der europäischen Währungsunion," Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, volume 49, number 49.
    3. Lipset, Seymour Martin, 1983. "Radicalism or Reformism: The Sources of Working-class Politics," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(1), pages 1-18, March.
    4. Evans, Geoffrey & Whitefield, Stephen, 1993. "Identifying the Bases of Party Competition in Eastern Europe," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(4), pages 521-548, October.
    5. Merkel, Wolfgang, 1994. "Restriktionen und Chancen demokratischer Konsolidierung in postkommunistischen Gesellschaften: Ostmitteleuropa im Vergleich," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 4(4), pages 463-484.
    6. Ganghof, Steffen, 2004. "Wer regiert in der Steuerpolitik? Einkommensteuerreform zwischen internationalem Wettbewerb und nationalen Verteilungskonflikten," Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, volume 50, number 50.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Avdagic, Sabina, 2006. "One Path or Several? Understanding the Varied Development of Tripartism in New European Capitalisms," MPIfG Discussion Paper 06/5, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Woll, Cornelia, 2005. "Learning to Act on World Trade: Preference Formation of Large Firms in the United States and the European Union," MPIfG Discussion Paper 05/1, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    2. Petrocik, John R., 1998. "Reformulating the Party Coalitions: The "Christian Democratic" Republicans," Institute for Social Science Research, Working Paper Series qt27r0t4k4, Institute for Social Science Research, UCLA.
    3. Cornelia Woll, 2005. "Learning to Act on World Trade. Preference Formation of Large Firms in the United States and the European Union," Sciences Po publications 05/01, Sciences Po.
    4. Manow, Philip & Zorn, Hendrik, 2004. "Office versus Policy Motives in Portfolio Allocation: The Case of Junior Ministers," MPIfG Discussion Paper 04/9, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    5. Cornelia Woll, 2005. "Learning to Act on World Trade. Preference Formation of Large Firms in the United States and the European Union," Working Papers hal-01065571, HAL.
    6. Manow, Philip & Burkhart, Simone, 2004. "Legislative Autolimitation under Divided Government: Evidence from the German Case, 1976-2002," MPIfG Discussion Paper 04/11, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    7. Hall, Peter A. & Gingerich, Daniel W., 2004. "Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities in the Macroeconomy," MPIfG Discussion Paper 04/5, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    8. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/8529 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Petrocik, John R., 1998. "The Blanket Primary: Candidate Strategy and Voter Response," Institute for Social Science Research, Working Paper Series qt4qt553wq, Institute for Social Science Research, UCLA.
    10. Zorn, Hendrik & Schäfer, Armin & Manow, Philip, 2004. "European Social Policy and Europe's Party-Political Center of Gravity, 1957-2003," MPIfG Discussion Paper 04/6, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    11. Scharpf, Fritz W., 2004. "Legitimationskonzepte jenseits des Nationalstaats," MPIfG Working Paper 04/6, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    12. Walsh, Frank, 2013. "The union wage effect and ability bias: Evidence from Ireland," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(3), pages 296-298.
    13. Addison, John T. & Belfield, Clive R., 2004. "Unions, Training, and Firm Performance: Evidence from the British Workplace Employee Relations Survey," IZA Discussion Papers 1264, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    14. Thomas Grandner, 2006. "A Note on Franchising and Wage Bargaining," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 87(3), pages 281-293, April.
    15. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/8529 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Kemmerling, Achim & Bruttel, Oliver, 2005. "New politics in German labour market policy? The implications of the recent Hartz reforms for the German welfare state," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Labor Market Policy and Employment SP I 2005-101, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    17. Olivier Guillot & Magali Jaoul-Grammare & Isabelle Terraz, 2019. "Union Membership in France: An Empirical Study," Working Papers of BETA 2019-04, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    18. Hylke Vandenbussche & Maurizio Zanardi, 2008. "What explains the proliferation of antidumping laws? [‘Antidumping Laws in the US; Use and Welfare Consequences’]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 23(53), pages 94-138.
    19. Cardullo, Gabriele & Conti, Maurizio & Sulis, Giovanni, 2015. "Sunk capital, unions and the hold-up problem: Theory and evidence from cross-country sectoral data," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 253-274.
    20. Alex Bryson & P Willman, 2007. "Union Organization in Great Britain," CEP Discussion Papers dp0774, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    21. Blanchflower, David G. & Bryson, Alex, 2008. "Union Decline in Britain," IZA Discussion Papers 3436, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    22. Silviano Esteve Pérez & Mariluz Marco Aledo & María Engracia Rochina Barrachina, 2006. "A Competing Risks Analysis of Strike Duration in Spain: Agreement and Non-Agreement Outcomes," Revista de Economía Laboral - Spanish Journal of Labour Economics, Asociación Española de Economía Laboral - AEET, vol. 3, pages 14-45.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgd:p0067. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/mpigfde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.