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The political economy of EC protectionism: National protectionism based on art. 115, treaty of Rome

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  • Schuknecht, Ludger

Abstract

In this paper, I will explain the role of Art. 115 ToR (Treaty of Rome). Art. 115 serves mainly bureaucratic interests and domestic interests to obtain protection. The decision-making process suggests a mixed system of administered protection and influences from the political market. Protection results from a rather complex interdependence of bureaucracy, politicians and interest groups. Correspondingly, the level of protection depends on the economic situation as well as the institutional setting and its changes. Looking at the structure of 115-protection, it is noticeable that textile and clothing manufacturers are the principal "clients". While Art. 115 accomodates specific protectionist interests of the textile/clothing sector it provides "low key" protection to other manufacturers. Finally, an empirical study will provide some support of the main hypothesis.

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  • Schuknecht, Ludger, 1989. "The political economy of EC protectionism: National protectionism based on art. 115, treaty of Rome," Discussion Papers, Series II 81, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:kondp2:81
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    1. Koopmann, Georg, 1984. "Nationaler Protektionismus und gemeinsame Handelspolitik in der EG," Wirtschaftsdienst – Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik (1949 - 2007), ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 64(5), pages 245-251.
    2. J.M. Finger & H. Keith Hall & Douglas R. Nelson, 2002. "The Political Economy of Administered Protection," Chapters, in: Institutions and Trade Policy, chapter 8, pages 81-95, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Korn, Peter, 1981. "Zunehmender Protektionismus in der EG," Wirtschaftsdienst – Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik (1949 - 2007), ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 61(10), pages 508-514.
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    5. George J. Stigler, 1974. "Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 359-365, Autumn.
    6. Baldwin, Robert E., 1988. "Trade Policy in a Changing World Economy," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226036113, September.
    7. Eric Verreydt & Jean Waelbroeck, 1982. "European Community Protection against Manufactured Imports from Developing Countries: A Case Study in the Political Economy of Protection," NBER Chapters, in: Import Competition and Response, pages 369-400, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Angelika Eymann & Ludger Schuknecht, 1996. "Antidumping Policy In The European Community: Political Discretion Or Technical Determination," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(2), pages 111-131, July.
    2. Weck-Hannemann, Hannelore, 1990. "Politische Ökonomie des Protektionismus: Ein institutioneller Ansatz," Discussion Papers, Series II 109, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    3. Schuknecht, Ludger & Ursprung, Heinrich W., 1990. "Die Anti-Dumping-Politik der EG und der USA: Ein Vergleich aus der Sicht der neuen politischen Ökonomie," Discussion Papers, Series II 98, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".

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