Appropriation of common access natural resources through exploration: A differential game of a claiming rush
AbstractThis paper provides a model of natural resource exploration, where the sole motivation to explore arises from a strategic incentive to preempt competitors. It is assumed that private ownership rights over a finite unexplored and commonly held resource stock can be established through a costly deterministic exploration process. The open-loop and the feedback Nash equilibrium is analysed. It is shown that in between intervals of soaring exploratory activities there may be an interval where exploration is declining over time. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Konstanz, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers, Series 1 with number 206.
Date of creation: 1985
Date of revision:
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- Arrow, Kenneth J. & Chang, Sheldon, 1982. "Optimal pricing, use, and exploration of uncertain natural resource stocks," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 1-10, March.
- Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1984. "Common Property Resources, Storage Facilities and Ownership Structures: A Cournot Model of the Oil Market," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 51(23), pages 235-52, August.
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