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Signalling in credit markets

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  • Milde, Hellmuth
  • Riley, John

Abstract

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  • Milde, Hellmuth & Riley, John, 1984. "Signalling in credit markets," Discussion Papers, Series I 185, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:kondp1:185
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    2. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    3. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Thakor, Anjan V. & Udell, Gregory F., 1987. "An economic rationale for the pricing structure of bank loan commitments," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 271-289, June.
    2. John G. Riley, 1984. "Competitive Signalling Reconsidered," UCLA Economics Working Papers 294, UCLA Department of Economics.

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