Voluntary contributing in a neighborhood public good game: An experimental study
AbstractIn repeated Public Good Games contributions might be influenced by different motives. The variety of motives for deciding between (more or less) free-riding probably explains the seemingly endless tradition of theoretical and experimental studies of repeated Public Good Games. To more clearly distinguish the motives, we try to enrich the choice set by allowing players not only to contribute but also to locate their contribution to one of the player positions. The location choice affects what individual players gain, but not the overall efficiency of contributing, and allows for discrimination, e.g., rewarding and sanctioning co-players differently. Our experimental results show that adding location choice promotes voluntary cooperation, although discrimination itself has no signifficant effect on behavior. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Business Engineering in its series Working Paper Series in Economics with number 11.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Public Good Game; Neighborhood; Cooperation; Experimental Analysis;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-11-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2010-11-27 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2010-11-27 (Game Theory)
- NEP-NET-2010-11-27 (Network Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2010-11-27 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2010-11-27 (Public Finance)
- NEP-URE-2010-11-27 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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