Institutional choice in social dilemmas: An experimental approach
AbstractThis paper presents an experimental study on the ability of human groups to escape the tragedy of the commons through institutional change. It shows that the groups identify institutional change as a means of resolving social dilemmas and are ready to apply it even if the change requires an unanimous vote. At the same time, the groups who were given the right to change the rules performed poorer on average than the control-groups. This result stands in contradiction to elementary economic reasoning as well as the results of previous experimental studies. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Justus Liebig University Giessen, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften in its series Finanzwissenschaftliche Arbeitspapiere with number 63.
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
social dilemmas; common pool resource; laboratory experiment; group behavior; institutional choice;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
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