Incentive to invest in improving the quality in telecommunication industry
AbstractThis paper investigates the incentives to invest in improving the quality (as distinguished to investment in a new activity) in telecommunication industry using the empirical example of wireless markets. We highlight that investment incentives are positively related to the potential for technical progress. They also depend on market structure, competition intensity and penetration rate. We show that there is a target amount of investment for each national market that firms strive to achieve. We show that, from a social perspective, this target amount is the best amount that firms are encouraged to invest. Nonachievement of the target amount entails underinvestment, a fall in consumer surplus and welfare and may slow down technical progress. Employing a 30 countries dataset during 8 years, we have empirically found a change in investment behaviour according whether the target amount is achieved or not. A low margin per user may hamper the achievement of the target amount. As a result, the maximum consumer surplus as well as welfare occurs under imperfect competition and not under perfect competition. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by International Telecommunications Society (ITS) in its series 23rd European Regional ITS Conference, Vienna 2012 with number 60375.
Date of creation: 2012
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Competition; Investment; Investment incentives; Technical Progress; Regulation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D92 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
- O12 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
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