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Mind the Gap – Analyzing the Divergence between Constitutional Text and Constitutional Reality

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  • Voigt, Stefan

Abstract

Constitutional Economics - the analysis of constitutions drawing on the economic approach - has made important progress over the last two decades. The factors determining whether a constitution is complied with, however, have received only little attention. This is surprising, as a huge gap between constitutional text and constitutional reality seems to exist in many countries. In this paper, this gap is referred as the de jure/de facto gap. The paper discusses ways in which the gap can be researched systematically and surveys the scant available literature that has tried to do so thus far.

Suggested Citation

  • Voigt, Stefan, 2020. "Mind the Gap – Analyzing the Divergence between Constitutional Text and Constitutional Reality," ILE Working Paper Series 32, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ilewps:32
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    Cited by:

    1. Katarzyna Metelska‐Szaniawska, 2021. "Post‐socialist constitutions: The de jure–de facto gap, its effects and determinantsa," Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 29(2), pages 175-196, April.
    2. Jacek Lewkowicz & Michał Woźniak & Michał Wrzesiński, 2021. "Institutional Framework of Central Bank Independence: Revisited," Working Papers 2021-06, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    constitutional compliance; de jure/de facto gap;

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K38 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Human Rights Law; Gender Law; Animal Rights Law
    • P51 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems

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