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Bank behavior and bad loans: Implications for reforms in Eastern Europe

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  • Buch, Claudia M.

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  • Buch, Claudia M., 1995. "Bank behavior and bad loans: Implications for reforms in Eastern Europe," Kiel Working Papers 679, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:679
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    1. Ngo Long & Horst Siebert, 1992. "A model of the socialist firm in transition to a market economy," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 1-21, February.
    2. Buch, Claudia M., 1995. "Monetary policy and the transformation of the banking system in Eastern Europe," Kiel Working Papers 676, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    3. Leonard I. Nakamura, 1989. "Loan workouts and commercial bank information: why banks are special," Working Papers 89-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    4. Dermine, J., 1986. "Deposit rates, credit rates and bank capital : The Klein-Monti Model Revisited," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 99-114, March.
    5. Hellwig, Martin F, 1977. "A Model of Borrowing and Lending with Bankruptcy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(8), pages 1879-1906, November.
    6. Begg, David & Portes, Richard, 1993. "Enterprise debt and financial restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 396-407, April.
    7. Tirole, Jean, 1994. "On banking and intermediation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 469-487, April.
    8. Sweder van Wijnbergen, 1993. "Enterprise reform in Eastern Europe," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 1(1), pages 21-38, January.
    9. Dewatripont, Mathias & Tirole, Jean, 1992. "Efficient Governance Structure : Implications for Banking Regulation," IDEI Working Papers 18, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    10. David Begg & Richard Portes, 1993. "Enterprise debt and economic transformation (Financial restructuring of the state sector in Central and Eastern Europe)," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 1(1), pages 116-117, January.
    11. Saunders, Anthony & Strock, Elizabeth & Travlos, Nickolaos G, 1990. "Ownership Structure, Deregulation, and Bank Risk Taking," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(2), pages 643-654, June.
    12. Shrieves, Ronald E. & Dahl, Drew, 1992. "The relationship between risk and capital in commercial banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 439-457, April.
    13. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    14. Mayer,Colin & Vives,Xavier (ed.), 1993. "Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521443975.
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