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Haftung ex post versus Anreize ex ante: Einige Gedanken zur Umweltpolitik bei Unsicherheit

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  • Siebert, Horst

Abstract

Haftung ex post und Anreize ex ante sind institutionelle Arrangements, mit denen gesellschaftliches Risikomanagement in der Umweltpolitik betrieben werden kann. Umweltrisiken beziehen sich auf die Inzidenz von Emissionen im Umweltsystem, die Diffusion und die Akkumulation von Schadstoffen, die Irreversibilität von Veränderungen im Umweltbereich und auf die Art der Enstehung von Emissionen. In dem Beitrag wird zwischen kontiniuierlich auftretenden Emissionen, Störfällen und Schäden bei der Nutzung von Gütern unterschieden. Wären bei kontinuierlich auftretenden Emissionen Geschädigter und Verursacher eine Person, so würden die Umweltrisiken im Entscheidungskalkül des einzigen Eigentümers berücksichtigt. Analog werden nach dem Coase-Theorem im Fall eines Geschädigten und eines Verursachers stochastische Umweltzustände in deterministische Werte transformiert. Im einfachen Coase-Fall gibt es auch keinen Unterschied zwischen den Fällen der Haftung und der Nicht-Haftung. Verläßt man die Welt von Coase, so trifft das Haftungsprinzip bei kontinuierlich auftretenden Emissionen auf eine Reihe von Problemen. Dazu zählen die kaum zu identifizierbare Kausalität zwischen allgemeinen Schäden und Emissionen eines einzelnen Verursachers infolge von Diffusion und infolge der Akkumulation in der Zeit, die Möglichkeit des Verursachers, die Transformation von stochastischen Eigenschaften der durch ihn verursachten Umweltschäden in Kompensationen zu unterlaufen(Gerichtsprozesse, Beschränkung der Haftung) und der Informationsvorsprung über Umweltrisiken bei regulierenden Stellen. Insgesamt darf man vermuten, daß das Haftungsprinzip bei kontinuierlichen Emissionen zu hohe Transaktionskosten verursacht und nicht eine Minimierung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Kosten der Umweltnutzung bei Unsicherheit bringt. "Ex-ante"-Anreize lösen in einem formalen Sinn das Zuweisungsproblem, indem sie an den Emissionen ansetzen. Allerdings verlagert dieser Ansatz der "ex-ante-Anreize" das Z
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  • Siebert, Horst, 1988. "Haftung ex post versus Anreize ex ante: Einige Gedanken zur Umweltpolitik bei Unsicherheit," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy 2000, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkie:2000
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    1. Weidner, Helmut, 1986. "Japan - the success and limitations of technocratic environmental policy," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 14(1), pages 43-70.
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    1. Bartsch, Elga, 1997. "Environmental liability, imperfect information, and multidimensional pollution control," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 139-146, March.
    2. Berlemann, Michael, 1997. "Ein Ansatz zur experimentellen Überprüfung der ökonomischen Theorie des Haftungsrechts," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 03/97, Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.

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