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Challenges Associated with the Expansion of Deposit Insurance Coverage during Fall 2008

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  • Schich, Sebastian T.

Abstract

Government provision of a financial safety net for financial institutions has been a key element of the policy response to the current crisis, with governments extending existing guarantees and introducing new ones. These measures have been helpful in avoiding a further accelerated loss of confidence. But they are not costless. Like any guarantee, deposit insurance gives rise to moral hazard, especially if the coverage is unlimited. Clearly, in the midst of a crisis, one should not be overly concerned with moral hazard, as the immediate task is to restore confidence, and guarantees can be helpful in that respect. Nonetheless, to keep market discipline operational, it is important to specify when the extra insurance will end, and this timeline needs to be credible. To be able to establish such a timeline the root causes of the lack of confidence - that is the effects of troubled assets on financial firms' health - need to be addressed effectively. On a more fundamental level, once a government has ventured down the road of guarantee expansion, there may be a general perception that a government guarantee will always be available during crisis situations. As a consequence, other elements of the financial safety net may need to be strengthened, including the prudential and supervisory framework.

Suggested Citation

  • Schich, Sebastian T., 2009. "Challenges Associated with the Expansion of Deposit Insurance Coverage during Fall 2008," Economics Discussion Papers 2009-16, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:7540
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    Cited by:

    1. Beat Bernet & Susanna Walter, 2009. "Design, Structure and Implementation of a Modern Deposit Insurance Scheme," SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum, number 2009/5 edited by Morten Balling, May.
    2. Todd, Walker F., 2009. "Is this Risk Insurable? A Response to Sebastian Schich," Economics Discussion Papers 2009-21, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Policy responses to financial crisis; safety net; deposit insurance; moral hazard;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises

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