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Preisbildung bei unvollkommener Konkurrenz

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  • Weiss, Christoph R.

Abstract

Vollkommene Konkurrenz auf Märkten ist dadurch charakterisiert, dass die Handlungen einzelner Wirtschaftssubjekte für alle anderen Wirtschaftssubjekte irrelevant sind. Jeder Einzelne kann das Gesamtergebnis (z.B. die Preise) auf einem Markt nicht unmittelbar beeinflussen; im Begriff des "atomistischen Marktes" wird dies auch bildlich ausgedrückt. Diese Marktform ist weniger als Beschreibung tatsächlicher Märkte gedacht, sondern als Gedankenexperiment zur möglichst einfachen Beschreibung einer Extremsituation. In der überwiegenden Zahl von Märkten der Agrar- und Ernährungswirtschaft spielen die Handlungen einzelner Anbieter sehr wohl eine wesentliche Rolle für das Gleichgewicht auf dem Gesamtmarkt: Konkurrenz ist typischerweise unvollkommen. Zahlreiche Beispiele aus der Wertschöpfungskette der Land- und Ernährungswirtschaft, von der Erzeugung wichtiger Vorleistungen bis zum Konsum des Endproduktes, können dies verdeutlichen. Der Weltmarkt der Produktion von Mineraldünger beispielsweise wird von etwa zehn international tätigen Unternehmen dominiert. Hohe Entwicklungskosten für neues Saatgut sind ein wesentlicher Grund für die zunehmende Marktkonzentration im Bereich der Pflanzenzüchtung; auch hier sind weltweit nur noch wenige Anbieter tätig. Besonders ausgeprägt ist der Konzentrationsprozess auch im Lebensmitteleinzelhandel. Handelsketten können im Einkauf in Verhandlungen mit den Nahrungsmittelproduzenten möglicherweise ihre Verhandlungsmacht geltend machen. Zudem wirft die hohe Anbieterkonzentration im Lebensmitteleinzelhandel die Frage auf, ob Konsumenten überhöhte Preise für einzelne Lebensmittel zahlen. In diesem Kapitel werden folgende Themen besprochen: - Es wird gezeigt, wie sich Preise in unterschiedlichen Marktformen bilden und welche Folgen unvollkommene Konkurrenz (Marktmacht) für die Güterpreise hat. - Verschiedene Formen strategischer Interaktion werden unterschieden und deren Folgen für das Marktgleichgewicht (kurz- und langfristig) beleuchtet. - Methoden und Probleme der empirischen Messung von Marktmacht werden erläutert und an Hand von Fallbeispielen illustriert. - Wir beschreiben Interaktionen zwischen den Akteuren innerhalb der Wertschöpfungskette bei der Preisbildung. - Die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen der europäischen Wettbewerbspolitik sowie Beispiele wettbewerbspolitischer Eingriffe werden erläutert. (...)

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  • Weiss, Christoph R., 2020. "Preisbildung bei unvollkommener Konkurrenz," IAMO Discussion Papers 192, Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:iamodp:192
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