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Kyoto-Protokoll, Wettbewerb und WTO-Handelssystem


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  • Shin, Soonjae
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    Es wird häufig angenommen, dass nationale und grenzüberschreitende Klimapolitik, die aufgrund des Kyoto-Protokolls in den Industriestaaten eingeführt wird, durch die Einschränkung der Nutzung fossiler Energieträger ökonomische Kosten verursacht. Damit kann es zwischen den emissionsintensiven Industrien der Staaten, die Kyoto-Ziele umsetzen müssen, und denen der Staaten ohne eine solche Verpflichtung zu Wettbewerbsverzerrungen kommen. Langfristig kann jedoch technologischer Fortschritt die Klimaschutzkosten signifikant senken und dadurch die Wettbewerbsverzerrung mindern. Dennoch ist nicht auszuschließen, dass die kurzfristigen Wettbewerbsverzerrungen aufgrund einer differenzierten Einführung klimapolitischer Instrumente je nach Sektor durchaus beträchtlich sein können. Vor diesem Hintergrund erscheint es wahrscheinlich, dass die betroffenen Staaten in Erwägung ziehen, nationale klimapolitische Instrumente einseitig handelspolitisch zu flankieren. Eine weitere Schnittstelle zwischen WTO-Handelsregeln und klimapolitischen Instrumenten könnte darüber hinaus durch die Kyoto-Instrumente selbst geschaffen werden. Es ist vorstellbar, dass die Kyoto-Instrumente durch die Schaffung einer neuen internationalen Handelsplattform in Form der Emissionseinheiten handelspolitische Konsequenzen haben. Die politische Koordination zwischen Kyoto-Protokoll und WTOHandelssystem ist daher eine notwendige Voraussetzung, um klare Rahmenbedingungen für die Implementierung klimapolitisch motivierter handelspolitischer Maßnahmen sowie der Kyoto-Instrumente zu schaffen. Dies sollte im Rahmen der laufenden Doha-Runde mit berücksichtigt werden. -- National and transboundary climate policy, introduced to industrialised countries due to the Kyoto Protocol, is often assumed to cause economic costs by restricting the utilisation of fossil fuels. This can result in a distortion of competition between the energy-intensive industries of countries, putting Kyoto-target into practice, and those of countries without such obligation. This assumption is however likely to be a short-term phenomenon. In the long term, technological progress can reduce economic costs for climate protection significantly and thus diminish the distortion of competition. However, one can not exclude the possibility that short-term competition distortion of climate policy could be considerable, depending on the sector. As a consequence, it could be found that climate policy instruments will result in one-sided trade policy. A further interface between climate policy and the trade rules of WTO can be created by the Kyoto instruments themselves. It is possible that the Kyoto instruments will have trade policy consequences by creating a new international trade market for emission units. The political co-ordination between the Kyoto Protocol and the trade system of WTO can finally contribute to the creation of clear basic conditions for trade policy measures with regard to climate protection as well as the Kyoto instruments. This should be tackled without delay in the frame of Doha-Round.

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    Paper provided by Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA) in its series HWWA Discussion Papers with number 215.

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    Date of creation: 2003
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:hwwadp:26348

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    Keywords: internationale Klimapolitik; Wettbewerb; internationale Handelsregeln; politische Koordination;

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