What Determines Evaluation Outcomes? Evidence from Bi- and Multilateral Development Cooperation
AbstractDonor agencies invest considerable financial and human resources to evaluate the outcome of their development activities. To derive institutional conditions conducive to an efficient use of these resources, we develop a multi-level principal-agent model focusing on the various interests of the different actors involved in the evaluation process. The model highlights two central problems: (i) the aid agencies? conflicting objectives of transparency and self-legitimization, and (ii) the potential collusion between the evaluator and the project manager. Empirical evidence for the World Bank and different German donor agencies reveals concrete institutional requirements for a reduced evaluation bias and increased transparency. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA) in its series HWWA Discussion Papers with number 310.
Date of creation: 2004
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Web page: http://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/20
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Development cooperation; evaluation; political economy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
- H43 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Project Evaluation; Social Discount Rate
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