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Nationale Schuldenbremsen für die Länder der Europäischen Union: Taugt das deutsche Modell als Vorbild?


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  • Hetschko, Clemens
  • Quint, Dominic
  • Thye, Marius


Zu den Verpflichtungen der Mitglieder im Europäischen Fiskalpakt gehört unter anderem, eine nationale Schuldenbremse einzuführen - eine Regel zur Begrenzung der jährlichen Neuverschuldung. Deutschland ist diesen Schritt bereits gegangen. Im vorliegenden Beitrag überprüfen wir, inwieweit das deutsche Modell als Vorbild für andere Staaten des Euroraums taugt. Wir hinterfragen dazu, ob es Regierungen und Parlamente im Aufnehmen von Schulden wirksam einschränkt. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit schenken wir dem Verfahren zur Konjunkturbereinigung. Auf Grundlage eigener Ex-Post-Simulationen kommen wir zu dem Ergebnis, dass es Regierungen und Parlamenten erhebliche Verschuldungsspielräume einräumt, die dem Ziel einer Schuldengrenze zuwiderlaufen. Ähnliche Zweifel an der Zielgenauigkeit der im deutschen Modell gefundenen Regelungen begründen wir im Hinblick auf die Bereinigung um finanzielle Transaktionen, Ausnahmen in Notsituationen und den Stabilitätsrat. Wir gehen ferner darauf ein, wie Staaten das Modell im Sinne eines (noch) wirksameren Mechanismus weiterentwickeln könnten. --

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Paper provided by Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 2012/12.

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Date of creation: 2012
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:201212

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Keywords: Staatsverschuldung; Europäischer Fiskalpakt; Schuldenbremse;

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Cited by:
  1. Hattendorff, Christian, 2012. "Do natural resource sectors rely less on external finance than manufacturing sectors?," Discussion Papers 2012/17, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
  2. Moritz Schularick & Paul Wachtel, 2012. "The Making of America’s Imbalances," INET Research Notes 8, Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET).


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