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The Interplay between Public and Private Information in Asset Markets: Theoretical and Experimental Approaches

Author

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  • Alfarano, Simone
  • Camacho, Eva
  • Petrovic, Marko
  • Provenzano, Giulia

Abstract

In this paper we will give an overview of the more relevant results on the theoretical and experimental research related to public and private information dissemination and aggregation in asset markets, focusing mainly on the contemporaneous presence of public and private information and its effect on market performance. We conclude that the theoretical literature is more developed than the experimental one when dealing with public information and its role in different economic environments. Therefore, a promising research avenue opens for experimentally testing the different, and often contradictory, theoretical results.

Suggested Citation

  • Alfarano, Simone & Camacho, Eva & Petrovic, Marko & Provenzano, Giulia, 2014. "The Interplay between Public and Private Information in Asset Markets: Theoretical and Experimental Approaches," FinMaP-Working Papers 9, Collaborative EU Project FinMaP - Financial Distortions and Macroeconomic Performance: Expectations, Constraints and Interaction of Agents.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:fmpwps:9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    experiments; financial markets; private and public information; central bank information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

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