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Ordnung

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  • Schmidtchen, Dieter
  • Kirstein, Roland

Abstract

Der Beitrag stellt die Bedeutung von Handlungsbeschränkungen für die Erwartungsstabilisierung und Koordination von Handlungen heraus. An einem einfachen Modell aus der evolutorischen Spieltheorie wird die Bildung von Konventionen und deren Bedeutung für die Reduktion von Transaktionskosten erläutert. -- The paper defines "order" as constraints that are designed or spontaneously evolved to constrain human action sets in order to stabilze expectations, and therefore enhance coordination of interactive behavior. A simple model of evolutionary game theory is used to explain the evolution of conventions and to point out their role in the reduction of transaction costs.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics in its series CSLE Discussion Paper Series with number 99-10.

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Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:9910

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Keywords: Evolutorische Ökonomik; Spontane Ordnung; Transaktionskosten;

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References

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  1. George J. Mailath, 1998. "Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 36(3), pages 1347-1374, September.
  2. Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 1981. "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, January.
  3. Heiner, Ronald A, 1983. "The Origin of Predictable Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 560-95, September.
  4. Dahlman, Carl J, 1979. "The Problem of Externality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(1), pages 141-62, April.
  5. Deakin, S., 2011. "Legal Evolution: Integrating Economic and Systemic Approaches," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers, ESRC Centre for Business Research wp424, ESRC Centre for Business Research.
  6. Deakin Simon, 2011. "Legal Evolution: Integrating Economic and Systemic Approaches," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 7(3), pages 659-683, December.
  7. Sugden, Robert, 1989. "Spontaneous Order," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 85-97, Fall.
  8. Kunz, Harald, 1985. "Marktsystem und Information," Untersuchungen zur Ordnungstheorie und Ordnungspolitik, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen;Walter Eucken Institut, Freiburg, Germany, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen;Walter Eucken Institut, Freiburg, Germany, edition 1, volume 20, number urn:isbn:9783163449169.
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