Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Efficient Compensation for Employees? Inventions

Contents:

Author Info

  • Kirstein, Roland
  • Will, Birgit E.

Abstract

We analyze the legal reform concerning employees? inventions in Germany. Using a simple principal-agent model, we derive a unique efficient payment scheme: a bonus which is contingent on the project value. We demonstrate that the old German law creates inefficient incentives. However, the new law concerning university employees and the pending reform proposal concerning other employees also fail to implement first-best incentives. With suboptimal incentives to spend effort on inventions, the government?s goal, an increase in the number of patents, is likely to be missed. (88 words) --

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/23132/1/2003-03_inventions.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics in its series CSLE Discussion Paper Series with number 2003-03.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:200303

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Postfach 151150, 66041 Saarbrücken
Phone: *49(0)681-302 2132
Fax: *49(0)681-302 3591
Email:
Web page: http://www.uni-saarland.de/fak1/fr12/csle/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Moral hazard; hold-up; efficient fixed wage;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Klemperer, Paul, 1990. "How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 392, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Kotaro Suzumura, 1990. "Cooperative and Non-cooperative R&D in Oligopoly with Spillovers," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University a218, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  3. Bengt Holmstrom, 1981. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 471, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1982. "Strategic Commitment with R&D: The Symmetric Case," Working Papers, Queen's University, Department of Economics 516, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  5. Mark Schankerman, 1998. "How Valuable is Patent Protection? Estimates by Technology Field," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 77-107, Spring.
  6. Michael J. Meurer, 1989. "The Settlement of Patent Litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(1), pages 77-91, Spring.
  7. Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1983. "International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," NBER Working Papers 1192, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Crampes, Claude & Langinier, Corinne, 2002. "Litigation and Settlement in Patent Infringement Cases," Staff General Research Papers, Iowa State University, Department of Economics 5231, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  9. Lanjouw, Jean O & Pakes, Ariel & Putnam, Jonathan, 1998. "How to Count Patents and Value Intellectual Property: The Uses of Patent Renewal and Application Data," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(4), pages 405-32, December.
  10. Strausz, Roland, 1999. "Efficiency in Sequential Partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 140-156, March.
  11. Gallini, Nancy & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 2001. "Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley qt9wx2c2hz, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  12. Kitch, Edmund W, 1977. "The Nature and Function of the Patent System," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 265-90, October.
  13. Inderst, Roman, 2002. "Contract design and bargaining power," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 171-176, January.
  14. Suzanne Scotchmer, 1991. "Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 29-41, Winter.
  15. Eric Rasmusen, 1987. "Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 428-435, Autumn.
  16. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 2004. "Reexamining Drug Regulation from the Perspective of Innovation Policy," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(1), pages 126-, March.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:csledp:200303. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.