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A Framed Field Experiment on Collective Enforcement Mechanisms with Ethiopian Farmers

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  • Reichhuber, Anke
  • Camacho Cuena, Eva
  • Requate, Till

Abstract

We present the results of a framed field experiment with Ethiopian farmers that use the mountain rain forest as a common pool resource. Harvesting honey causes damage to the forest, and open access leads to overharvesting. We test different mechanisms for mitigating excessive harvesting: a collective tax with low and high tax rates, and a tax/subsidy system. We find that the high-tax scheme works best in inducing the desired level of harvesting while the tax-subsidy scheme may trigger tacit collusion. Via a panel data analysis we further investigate which variables influence the subjects? decisions during the treatments. --

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics in its series Economics Working Papers with number 2008,11.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:cauewp:7372

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Keywords: common pool resources; collective tax; framed field experiment;

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References

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  1. Spraggon, John, 2002. "Exogenous targeting instruments as a solution to group moral hazards," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 427-456, June.
  2. Camacho Cuena, Eva & Requate, Till, 2004. "Collective and Random Fining versus Tax/Subsidy - Schemes to Regulate Non-Point Pollution : An Experimental Study," Economics Working Papers 2004,10, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
  3. Christian A. Vossler & Gregory L. Poe & William D. Schulze & Kathleen Segerson, 2006. "Communication and Incentive Mechanisms Based on Group Performance: An Experimental Study of Nonpoint Pollution Control," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 44(4), pages 599-613, October.
  4. Glenn W. Harrison & John A. List, 2004. "Field Experiments," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(4), pages 1009-1055, December.
  5. Abraham Neyman, 1999. "Cooperation in Repeated Games when the Number of Stages is Not Commonly Known," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 45-64, January.
  6. Juan-Camilo Cardenas & John Stranlund & Cleve Willis, 2000. "Local environmental control and institutional crowding-out," Artefactual Field Experiments 00028, The Field Experiments Website.
  7. David Kreps & Paul Milgrom & John Roberts & Bob Wilson, 2010. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Levine's Working Paper Archive 239, David K. Levine.
  8. Francisco Alpízar & Till Requate & Albert Schram, 2004. "Collective versus Random Fining: An Experimental Study on Controlling Ambient Pollution," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 29(2), pages 231-252, October.
  9. Maria Alejandra Vélez & John K. Stranlund & James J. Murphy, 2005. "What Motivates Common Pool Resource Users? Experimental Evidence from the Field," Working Papers 2005-4, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics.
  10. François Cochard & Marc Willinger & Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2005. "Efficiency of Nonpoint Source Pollution Instruments: An Experimental Study," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 30(4), pages 393-422, 04.
  11. Francois Cochard & Anthony Ziegelmeyer & Kene Boun My, 2005. "The Regulation of Nonpoint Emissions in the Laboratory: A Stress Test of the Ambient Tax Mechanism," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-37, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  12. Segerson, Kathleen, 1988. "Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 87-98, March.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Camacho-Cuena, Eva & Requate, Till, 2012. "The regulation of non-point source pollution and risk preferences: An experimental approach," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 179-187.
  2. Narloch, Ulf & Pascual, Unai & Drucker, Adam G., 2012. "Collective Action Dynamics under External Rewards: Experimental Insights from Andean Farming Communities," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(10), pages 2096-2107.
  3. Rode, Julian & Gómez-Baggethun, Erik & Krause, Torsten, 2013. "Economic incentives for biodiversity conservation: What is the evidence for motivation crowding?," UFZ Discussion Papers 19/2013, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ), Division of Social Sciences (ÖKUS).

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