The Political Economy of Environmental Regulations and Industry Compensation
AbstractThis paper uses a political-economy framework to analyze what consequences the exogenous introduction of a quantitative restriction on total emissions in a small open economy has on the stringency of domestic trade policy. The question is whether and to what extent the government, if it takes different lobby groups´ interests into consideration, has an incentive to compensate the polluting industry for stricter environmental regulations by granting higher protection to it. It turns out that the government will indeed tend to increase subsidization of the industry affected by environmental regulation. This compensation will even be more than complete as long as environmental interests are taken into account. Hence, contrary to what might be expected, a net benefit for the polluting sector arises from environmental restrictions. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics in its series Economics Working Papers with number 2007,13.
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Environmental Regulations; International Competitiveness; Political Economy; Trade Policy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
- Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
- F18 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Environment
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