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Demand rationing in Bertrand-Edgeworth markets with fixed capacities: An experiment

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  • Jacobs, Martin
  • Requate, Till

Abstract

This study is the first to investigate the effect of demand rationing in experimental Bertrand-Edgeworth markets with fixed exogenous capacities. It is found that prices and profits are significantly higher under proportional than under efficient demand rationing. Moreover, the amount of capacity available to each firm is varied. In accordance with earlier studies, prices and profits are significantly higher when capacities are lower. Those effects accord qualitatively with the Nash equilibrium predictions of the corresponding stage games. However, the Nash equilibrium concept does poorly at quantitative predictions. Prices are significantly higher than the Nash prediction in all treatments, irrespective of whether the Nash equilibrium is in mixed or in pure strategies. Profits are higher than the Nash prediction with high capacities, but may converge to the equilibrium prediction in the long run with low capacities. The data of individual price choices feature dynamic patterns that can potentially be explained by both Edgeworth price cycles and imitation of the price set by the competitor.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacobs, Martin & Requate, Till, 2016. "Demand rationing in Bertrand-Edgeworth markets with fixed capacities: An experiment," Economics Working Papers 2016-03, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cauewp:201603
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jacobs, Martin & Requate, Till, 2016. "Bertrand-Edgeworth markets with increasing marginal costs and voluntary trading: Experimental evidence," Economics Working Papers 2016-01, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
    2. Philippe Gillen & Alexander Rasch & Achim Wambach & Peter Werner, 2016. "Bid pooling in reverse multi-unit Dutch auctions: an experimental investigation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(4), pages 511-534, November.
    3. Jacobs Martin, 2016. "Number of Firms, Rationing, Matching, and Knowledge: A Comprehensive Study of Variations in Experimental Kreps–Scheinkman Markets," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(3), pages 1273-1319, September.
    4. Jacobs, Martin, 2016. "Number of firms, rationing, matching, and knowledge: A comprehensive study of variations in experimental Kreps-Scheinkman markets," Economics Working Papers 2016-02, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bertrand-Edgeworth; demand rationing; Edgeworth cycles; oligopoly; laboratory experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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