IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/bubdps/052012.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Regulation, credit risk transfer with CDS, and bank lending

Author

Listed:
  • Pausch, Thilo
  • Welzel, Peter

Abstract

We integrate Basel II (and III) regulations into the industrial organization approach to banking and analyze the interaction between capital adequacy regulation and credit risk transfer with credit default swaps (CDS) including its effect on lending behavior and risk sensitivity of a risk-neutral bank. CDS contracts may be used to hedge a bank's credit risk exposure at a certain (potentially distorted) price. Regulation is found to induce the risk-neutral bank to behave in a more risk-sensitive way: Compared to a situation without regulation the optimal volume of loans decreases more as the riskiness of loansincreases. CDS trading is found to interact with the former effect when regulation accepts CDS as an instrument to mitigate credit risk. Under the substitution approach in Basel II (and III) a risk-neutral bank will over-, fully or under-hedge its total exposure to credit risk conditional on the CDS price being downward biased, unbiased or upward biased. However, the substitution approach weakens the tendency to over-hedge or under-hedge when CDS markets are biased. This promotes the intention of the Basel II (and III) regulations to 'strengthen the soundness and stability of banks'.

Suggested Citation

  • Pausch, Thilo & Welzel, Peter, 2012. "Regulation, credit risk transfer with CDS, and bank lending," Discussion Papers 05/2012, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bubdps:052012
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/56022/1/688561357.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Shi & Chang, Chuen-Ping, 2015. "Should bank loan portfolio be diversified under government capital injection and deposit insurance fund protection?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 131-141.
    2. Chang, Chuen-Ping & Chen, Shi, 2016. "Government capital injection, credit risk transfer, and bank performance during a financial crisis," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 477-486.
    3. Kick, Thomas & Pausch, Thilo & Ruprecht, Benedikt, 2015. "The winner's curse: Evidence on the danger of aggressive credit growth in banking," Discussion Papers 32/2015, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    4. Saibal Ghosh, 2015. "Macroprudential regulation and bank behaviour: theory and evidence from a quasi-natural experiment," Macroeconomics and Finance in Emerging Market Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(1-2), pages 138-159, July.
    5. Kero, Afroditi, 2013. "Banks’ risk taking, financial innovation and macroeconomic risk," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 112-124.
    6. Arnold, Marc, 2013. "This article analyzes the impact of the introduction of centrally cleared credit risk transfer on a loan originating bank's lending discipline in the primary loan market. Under Basel III, a bank can t," Working Papers on Finance 1321, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance, revised Dec 2014.
    7. Shi Chen & Ku-Jun Lin, 2015. "Credit Risk Hedging, Deposit Insurance Fund Protection, and Default Risk in Retail Banking during a Financial Crisis," Research in World Economy, Research in World Economy, Sciedu Press, vol. 6(1), pages 118-132, March.
    8. Tsai, Jeng-Yan, 2013. "Bank interest margin management based on a path-dependent Cobb–Douglas utility framework," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 751-762.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banking; regulation; credit risk;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:bubdps:052012. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dbbgvde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.