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Weimar Germany: the first open access order that failed?

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  • Reckendrees, Alfred

Abstract

The Weimar Republic is analysed within the framework of limited and open access orders. Germany had developed into a mature limited access order before World War I, with rule of law and open economic access but only limited access to politics. After the war, Germany developed toward an open access order; this process was, however, not sustainable. Two interpretations are discussed, which both pose a challenge to the limited access-open access framework: (1.) Weimar Germany was the first open access order that failed; (2.) sufficiency conditions of the sustainability of open access are not yet included in the framework. It is proposed that sustainable open access orders do not only depend on open political and economic access and on the state monopolising violence capacities (coercive power); government and the political institutions must also have the capacity to efficiently create legitimacy via coordination capabilities.

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  • Reckendrees, Alfred, 2014. "Weimar Germany: the first open access order that failed?," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 14/05, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:aluord:1405
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    2. Steven Webb, 2017. "Populism: A Threat to Democracy? Or a verification of it?," Journal of Contextual Economics (JCE) – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, vol. 137(4), pages 401-420.

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    JEL classification:

    • N4 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation
    • O19 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
    • P1 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies

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