Markets for Attention: Will Postage for Email Help?
AbstractBalancing the needs of information distributors and their audiences has grown harder in the age of the Internet. While the demand for attention continues to increase rapidly with the volume of information and communication, the supply of human attention is relatively fixed. Markets are a social institution for efficiently balancing supply and demand of scarce resources. Charging a price for sending messages may help discipline senders from demanding more attention than they are willing to pay for. Price may also help recipients estimate the value of a message before reading it. We report the results of two laboratory experiments to explore the consequences of a pricing system for electronic mail. Charging postage for email causes senders to be more selective and send fewer messages. However, recipients did not use the postage paid by senders as a signal of importance. These studies suggest markets for attention have potential, but their design needs more work.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Yale School of Management in its series Yale School of Management Working Papers with number ysm394.
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2002
Date of revision: 01 Oct 2008
Computer Mediated Communication; Electronic Mail; Empirical Studies; Economics; Markets; Social Impact; Spam;
Other versions of this item:
- Shyam NMI Sunder & Matthew A. Cronin & Robert E. Kraut & James Morris & Rahul Telang, 2002. "Markets for Attention: Will Postage for Email Help?," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm301, Yale School of Management.
- L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
- M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General
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