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Structure, Clearinghouses and Symmetry

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Author Info
Martin Shubik () (Yale University, School of Management)
David Eric Smith () (Santa Fe Institute, Economics)

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Abstract

We introduce and justify a taxonomy for the structure of markets and minimal institutions which appear in constructing minimally complex trading structures to perform the functions of price formation, settlement and payments. Each structure is presented as a playable strategic market game and is examined for its efficiency, the number of degrees of freedom and the symmetry properties of the structure.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Yale School of Management in its series Yale School of Management Working Papers with number ysm378.

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Date of creation: 28 Jul 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm378

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Related research
Keywords: Strategic Market Games; Clearinghouses; Credit Evaluation; Default;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General
D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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  1. Dubey, Pradeep & Mas-Colell, Andreau & Shubik, Martin, 1980. "Efficiency properties of strategies market games: An axiomatic approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 339-362, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Sorin, Sylvain, 1996. "Strategic Market Games with Exchange Rates," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 431-446, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Martin Shubik, 2000. "The Theory of Money," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1253, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Amir, Rabah & Sahi, Siddharta & Shubik, Martin & Yao, Shuntian, 1990. "A strategic market game with complete markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 126-143, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Juergen Huber & Martin Shubik & Shyam Sunder, 2009. "Default Penalty as Disciplinary and Selection Mechanism in Presence of Multiple Equilibria," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1730, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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