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The Subjective and Objective Evaluation of Incentive Stock Options

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Author Info
Jonathan E. Ingersoll Jr. () (School of Management)
Abstract

Incentive options are held by managers and employees who invariably hold undiversified portfolios with substantial amounts invested in their own company's common stock. This lack of diversification makes the subjective value of incentive items such as options less than their market value. This paper derives a model for the marginal value of such options or other incentive items. As such, it can be used to evaluate heterogeneous options which mature on different dates. It can also be used each time a new option is granted. The identical model (with different parameters)can be used to determine three different values for each option, the market value, the subjective value and the objective values. The market value is the value the option would have if it were held by an unconstrained agent. The subjective value - the value of the holder - is less than the market value because the option is held in an undiversified portfolio and because it is exercised suboptimally from the market perspective. The objective value is the cost to the firm of issuing the option and lies between the market and subjective values. This value recognizes the suboptimal exercise but not the undiversified discount. The model is no more difficult to use than is the Black- Scholes model. In fact, under the same conditions, it is simply the Black-Scholes model with modified parameters. The model can also be easily extended to handle vesting, employment termination, indexing, repricing and any number of other features found in incentive options.

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Paper provided by Yale School of Management in its series Yale School of Management Working Papers with number ysm276.

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Date of creation: 15 Apr 2002
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Handle: RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm276

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing
J32 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Private Pensions
J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing

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  1. Kyriacou, Kyriacos & Luintel, Kul B & Mase, Bryan, 2008. "Private Information in Executives' Option Trades: Evidence from the UK," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2008/4, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section. [Downloadable!]
  2. Nittai K. Bergman & Dirk Jenter, 2005. "Employee Sentiment and Stock Option Compensation," NBER Working Papers 11409, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Marc Chesney & Rajna Gibson, 2008. "Stock options and managers’ incentives to cheat," Review of Derivatives Research, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 41-59, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Elettra Agliardi & Rainer Andergassen, 2005. "Incentives of Stock Option Based Compensation," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 21-32, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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