Does Skin in the Game Matter? Director Incentives and Governance in the Mutual Fund Industry
AbstractWe use a unique database on the ownership stakes and compensation of equity mutual fund directors to analyze whether the directors' incentive structure is related to fund performance. We find that governance plays an economically substantial and statistically significant role. The ownership stakes of both independent and non-independent directors matter for fund performance. Further, the various governance variables interact: funds with high director ownership outperform those with low director ownership only w
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Yale School of Management in its series Yale School of Management Working Papers with number amz2470.
Date of creation: 01 Mar 2005
Date of revision: 01 Nov 2008
Other versions of this item:
- Cremers, Martijn & Driessen, Joost & Maenhout, Pascal & Weinbaum, David, 2009. "Does Skin in the Game Matter? Director Incentives and Governance in the Mutual Fund Industry," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(06), pages 1345-1373, December.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Khorana, Ajay & Servaes, Henri & Wedge, Lei, 2006.
"Portfolio Manager Ownership and Fund Performance,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5931, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Andreu, Laura & Pütz, Alexander, 2012. "Are two business degrees better than one? Evidence from mutual fund managers' education," CFR Working Papers 12-01, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
- Abigail S. Hornstein & James Hounsell, 2013. "Managerial Investment in Mutual Funds," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers 2013-005, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics.
- Gottesman, Aron & Morey, Matthew, 2012. "Mutual fund corporate culture and performance," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 69-81.
- Qian, Meijun, 2011. "Is "voting with your feet" an effective mutual fund governance mechanism?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 45-61, February.
- Eric Fricke, 2013. "Board compensation, holdings and mutual fund expense ratios," Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 39(3), pages 228-250, February.
- Brown, Stephen & Goetzmann, William & Liang, Bing & Schwarz, Christopher, 2012.
"Trust and delegation,"
Journal of Financial Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 221-234.
- Stephen Brown & William Goetzmann & Bing Liang & Christopher Schwarz, 2009. "Trust and Delegation," NBER Working Papers 15529, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Stephen Brown & William Goetzmann & Bing Liang & Christopher Schwarz, 2009. "Trust and Delegation," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2545, Yale School of Management, revised 13 Nov 2009.
- Kempf, Alexander & Pütz, Alexander & Sonnenburg, Florian, 2012. "Fund manager duality: Impact on performance and investment behavior," CFR Working Papers 12-06, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.