Does Skin in the Game Matter? Director Incentives and Governance in the Mutual Fund Industry
Abstract
We use a unique database on the ownership stakes and compensation of equity mutual fund directors to analyze whether the directors' incentive structure is related to fund performance. We find that governance plays an economically substantial and statistically significant role. The ownership stakes of both independent and non-independent directors matter for fund performance. Further, the various governance variables interact: funds with high director ownership outperform those with low director ownership only wDownload Info
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Paper provided by Yale School of Management in its series Yale School of Management Working Papers with number amz2470.Length:
Date of creation: 01 Mar 2005
Date of revision: 01 Nov 2008
Handle: RePEc:ysm:somwrk:amz2470
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Web page: http://icf.som.yale.edu/
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Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Cremers, Martijn & Driessen, Joost & Maenhout, Pascal & Weinbaum, David, 2009. "Does Skin in the Game Matter? Director Incentives and Governance in the Mutual Fund Industry," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(06), pages 1345-1373, December.
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Khorana, Ajay & Servaes, Henri & Wedge, Lei, 2007.
"Portfolio manager ownership and fund performance,"
Journal of Financial Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 179-204, July.
- Khorana, Ajay & Servaes, Henri & Wedge, Lei, 2006. "Portfolio Manager Ownership and Fund Performance," CEPR Discussion Papers 5931, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kempf, Alexander & Pütz, Alexander & Sonnenburg, Florian, 2012. "Fund manager duality: Impact on performance and investment behavior," CFR Working Papers 12-06, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
- Stephen Brown & William Goetzmann & Bing Liang & Christopher Schwarz, 2009.
"Trust and Delegation,"
Yale School of Management Working Papers
amz2545, Yale School of Management, revised 13 Nov 2009.
- Brown, Stephen & Goetzmann, William & Liang, Bing & Schwarz, Christopher, 2012. "Trust and delegation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 221-234.
- Stephen Brown & William Goetzmann & Bing Liang & Christopher Schwarz, 2009. "Trust and Delegation," NBER Working Papers 15529, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Qian, Meijun, 2011. "Is "voting with your feet" an effective mutual fund governance mechanism?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 45-61, February.
- Andreu, Laura & Pütz, Alexander, 2012. "Are two business degrees better than one? Evidence from mutual fund managers' education," CFR Working Papers 12-01, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
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