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Patronage and power in rural India: a study based on interaction networks

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  • Anindya Bhattacharya
  • Anirban Kar
  • Sunil Kumar
  • Alita Nandi

Abstract

This work has two intertwined components: first, as part of a research programme it introduces a new methodology for identifying `power-centres' in rural societies of developing countries in general and then applies that in the specific context of contemporary rural India for addressing some debates on the dynamics of power in rural India. Land-ownership, caste hierarchy and patron-client relation have been regarded as the traditional building blocks of political-economic organization in rural India. However, many believe that gradual urbanization and expansion of market economy have eroded the influence of the traditional power structure. This work is a contribution toward identifying the nature of `local' rural institutions based on primary data collected by ourselves. We took 36 villages in the states of Maharashtra, Odisha and Uttar Pradesh - 12 in each of these states - as the sites for our observation and data collection. We quantify nature of institutions from data on the day-to-day interactions of households in the spheres of economy, society and politics. The aspect of institution we focus on is the structure of multidimensional and interlinked dependence in these spheres and whether such dependence is concentrated on a few `powerful' entities (called `local elites') dominating over a large number of households or whether this is distributed in a sufficiently diffuse manner. Our household survey shows that there is substantial variation in power structure across regions. We identified the presence of `local elites' in 22 villages out of 36 surveyed. We conducted a follow-up survey, called `elite survey', to get detailed information about the identified elite households. Our primary objective was to learn the socio-economic-political profile of the elite households and their involvement in village life. This paper provides a summary of our findings. We observe that landlordism has considerably weakened, land has ceased to be the sole source of power and new power-centres have emerged. Despite these changes, caste, landownership and patron-client relation continue to be three important pillars of rural power structure.

Suggested Citation

  • Anindya Bhattacharya & Anirban Kar & Sunil Kumar & Alita Nandi, 2018. "Patronage and power in rural India: a study based on interaction networks," Discussion Papers 18/19, Department of Economics, University of York.
  • Handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:18/19
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rao, Vijayendra & Ananthpur, Kripa & Malik, Kabir, 2017. "The Anatomy of Failure: An Ethnography of a Randomized Trial to Deepen Democracy in Rural India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 481-497.
    2. Anindya Bhattacharya & Anirban Kar & Alita Nandi, 2016. "Local Institutional Structure and Clientelistic Access to Employment: The Case of MGNREGS in Three States of India," Working Papers id:11549, eSocialSciences.
    3. Abhijit Banerjee & Lakshmi Iyer, 2005. "History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1190-1213, September.
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    5. Ministry of Finance, Government of India,, 2017. "Economic Survey 2016-17," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, edition 2, number 9780199477661.
    6. Cesi Cruz & Julien Labonne & Pablo Querubín, 2017. "Politician Family Networks and Electoral Outcomes: Evidence from the Philippines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(10), pages 3006-3037, October.
    7. Amit Basole & Deepankar Basu, 2010. "Relations of Production and Modes of Surplus Extraction in India," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2011-01, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yuqing Yang, 2023. "India: Developmental challenges faced by a dual economy," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 14(S4), pages 104-112, October.
    2. Anindya Bhattacharya & Anirban Kar & Alita Nandi, 2023. "Asymmetric networks, clientelism and their impacts: households' access to workfare employment in rural India," Papers 2304.04236, arXiv.org.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Clientelism; Lanlordism; Network.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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