We study a firm's incentives in an environment in which optimal contracts resemble debt. After agreeing to the terms of a financial contract, but before its earnings are realised, a firm has to take a decision which affects its cash flows. This decision cannot be observed by the lender; this is meant to capture risk-shifting possibilities fr
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim in its series Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications with number
99-61.
Length: 40 pages Date of creation: 15 Mar 1999 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:99-61
Note: Financial Support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged. Contact details of provider: Postal: D-68131 Mannheim Phone: (49) (0) 621-292-2547 Fax: (49) (0) 621-292-5594 Email: Web page: http://www.sfb504.uni-mannheim.de/ More information through EDIRC