Union Bargaining Strength as a Public Good: Experimental Evidence
AbstractWhen collective agreements apply to all employees, whether unionized or not, what is the rationale behind joining a union? The paper presents an experiment on a two-stage game. In the first stage, the decision to join a union is modeled as a voluntary contribution to a public good. In the second stage, the unionized employees bargain with the employer over wages. The experimental evidence reveals that: i) the union density is higher than predicted by theory but declining over time, ii) the size of the union increases the employees' bargaining power but not as much as predicted.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim in its series Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications with number 99-20.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 17 Mar 1999
Date of revision:
Note: Financial Support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged.
Contact details of provider:
Postal: D-68131 Mannheim
Phone: (49) (0) 621-292-2547
Fax: (49) (0) 621-292-5594
Web page: http://www.sfb504.uni-mannheim.de/
More information through EDIRC
Web page: http://www.sfb504.uni-mannheim.de
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Berninghaus, Siegfried & Guth, Werner & Keser, Claudia, 2003. "Unity suggests strength: an experimental study of decentralized and collective bargaining," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 465-479, August.
- Klaus Abbink & Heike Hennig-Schmidt, 2002.
"Neutral versus Loaded Instructions in a Bribery Experiment,"
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers
bgse23_2002, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Klaus Abbink & Heike Hennig-Schmidt, 2006. "Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 103-121, June.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Carsten Schmidt).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.