Driving competition in local gasoline markets
AbstractRelevant market definition is still a key element of economic analysis of competition in the gasoline market. It is particularly difficult to handle when competition is local and market power is geographically constrained like is the case in the gasoline market. We analyse how the application of the hypothetical monopolist or Small but Significant Non-Transitory Increase in Prices (SSNIP) test performs for defining isochrones using only information on prices and distance among competitors. We conclude that geographic information systems can be very successfully used to define more precisely relevant geographic market in the gasoline retailing. The application to the Spanish gasoline market concludes that geographic relevant market is composed by 5-6 minutes of travel time. Localised market power should be taken into account when analysing the adverse effects of mergers and entry regulations in gasoline retailing. Only drawing small enough isochrones will drive competition in local markets because it is just close rivals that compete effectively with each other.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Xarxa de Referència en Economia Aplicada (XREAP) in its series Working Papers with number XREAP2012-04.
Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2012
Date of revision: Mar 2012
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Espai de Recerca en Economia, Facultat de Ciències Econòmiques i Empresarials, Universitat de Barcelona, c/ Tinent Coronel Valenzuela, 1-11, 08034 Barcelona
Web page: http://www.pcb.ub.edu/xreap
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Gasoline; Market definition; Retailing.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- R12 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity; Interregional Trade (economic geography)
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-04-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2012-04-10 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2012-04-10 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-REG-2012-04-10 (Regulation)
- NEP-URE-2012-04-10 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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- Daniel Albalate & Jordi Perdiguero, 2012. "“Entry Regulation Asymmetries and Gasoline Competition in a Mixed Motorway Network”," IREA Working Papers 201218, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Nov 2012.
- Antonio Manresa & Ferran Sancho, 2012. "Leontief versus Ghosh: two faces of the same coin," Working Papers XREAP2012-18, Xarxa de Referència en Economia Aplicada (XREAP), revised Oct 2012.
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