Seniority and Anti-competitive Restrictions on the Legislative Common Pool: Tenure’s Impact on the Overall Production of Legislation and the Concentration of Political Benefits
AbstractIt is well established that geographic areas benefit, in terms of the share of government spending they capture, from having a legislator with higher tenure, holding constant the tenure of other legislators. However, the implications of this literature for how the total production of legislation changes if all members gained seniority is less clear. Drawing on the literature that uses an industrial organization framework to analyze legislative institutions, we explore the effects of average tenure and disparity in tenure on legislative production. Consistent with Holcombe and Parker (1991) we find that both factors help to enclose the legislative common pool.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, West Virginia University in its series Working Papers with number 09-11.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 2009
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Other versions of this item:
- Russell Sobel & Matt Ryan, 2012. "Seniority and anti-competitive restrictions on the legislative common pool: tenure’s impact on the overall production of legislation and the concentration of political benefits," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 153(1), pages 171-190, October.
- NEP-ALL-2009-12-19 (All new papers)
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