A Theoretical Model of the Distribution of Teacher Attention under Benchmark Testing
AbstractThis paper provides a tractable theoretical model designed to capture the targeting incentives created by benchmark testing. Under high-stakes benchmark testing, schools and teachers are judged on the fraction of students that meet some given level of educational attainment. The incentive for teachers is then to allocate their resources towards students who are on the margin of the pass/fail level of educational attainment. This behavior has some empirical support and the aim of the model is to provide a formal means of developing hypotheses for future research. A numerical simulation is used to confirm the model’s ability to capture this targeting behavior.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, West Virginia University in its series Working Papers with number 07-03.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://www.be.wvu.edu/phd_economics/
More information through EDIRC
Education; Teacher Incentives; No Child Left Behind; Student Achievement; Standardized Testing;
Other versions of this item:
- Justin Ross, 2008. "A theoretical model of the distribution of teacher attention under benchmark testing," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 9(29), pages 1-8.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Randall Reback, 2006.
"Teaching to the Rating: School Accountability and the Distribution of Student Achievement,"
Working Papers, Barnard College, Department of Economics
0602, Barnard College, Department of Economics.
- Reback, Randall, 2008. "Teaching to the rating: School accountability and the distribution of student achievement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 92(5-6), pages 1394-1415, June.
- Burgess, Simon & Propper, Carol & Slater, Helen & Wilson, Deborah, 2005.
"Who wins and who loses from school accountability? The distribution of educational gain in English secondary schools,"
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
5248, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Simon Burgess & Carol Propper & Helen Slater & Deborah Wilson, 2005. "Who wins and who loses from school accountability? The distribution of educational gain in English secondary schools," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK 05/128, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
- Deborah Wilson & Bronwyn Croxson & Adele Atkinson, 2004. "“What Gets Measured Gets Done”: Headteachers’ Responses to the English Secondary School," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK 04/107, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
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