Asymmetric Information may Protect the Commons: The Welfare Benefits of Uniformed Regulators
AbstractWe examine an entry-deterrence model in the commons. We investigate in which contexts the presence of asymmetric information among the fi?rms exploiting the commons becomes welfare improving, relative to complete information, and in which settings an uninformed regulator might have incentives to assess and disseminate the available stock among potential entrants.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University in its series Working Papers with number 2013-8.
Length: 10 pages
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Cost asymmetries; Entry Deterrence; Signaling; Commons; Welfare;
Other versions of this item:
- Espínola-Arredondo, Ana & Muñoz-García, Félix, 2013. "Asymmetric information may protect the commons: The welfare benefits of uninformed regulators," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(3), pages 463-467.
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics
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- Nicolas Faysse, 2005. "Coping with the Tragedy of the Commons: Game Structure and Design of Rules," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(2), pages 239-261, 04.
- Jérémy Laurent-Lucchetti & Justin Leroux & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2011.
"Splitting an Uncertain (Natural) Capital,"
Cahiers de recherche
- Charles F. Manson & Stephen Polasky, 1993.
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Boston College Working Papers in Economics
209, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia, 2010.
"Can Incomplete Information Lead to Under-exploitation in the Commons,"
2010-04, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
- Espínola-Arredondo, Ana & Muñoz-García, Félix, 2011. "Can incomplete information lead to under-exploitation in the commons?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 402-413.
- Polasky, Stephen & Bin, Okmyung, 2001. "Entry Deterrence and Signaling in a Nonrenewable Resource Model," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 235-256, November.
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