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Asymmetric Information may Protect the Commons: The Welfare Benefits of Uniformed Regulators

Author

Listed:
  • Ana Espinola-Arredondo
  • Felix Munoz-Garcia

    (School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University)

Abstract

We examine an entry-deterrence model in the commons. We investigate in which contexts the presence of asymmetric information among the fi?rms exploiting the commons becomes welfare improving, relative to complete information, and in which settings an uninformed regulator might have incentives to assess and disseminate the available stock among potential entrants.

Suggested Citation

  • Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia, "undated". "Asymmetric Information may Protect the Commons: The Welfare Benefits of Uniformed Regulators," Working Papers 2013-8, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsu:wpaper:munoz-14
    as

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    File URL: http://faculty.ses.wsu.edu/WorkingPapers/Munoz/WP2013-8.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mason, Charles F & Polasky, Stephen, 1994. "Entry Deterrence in the Commons," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(2), pages 507-525, May.
    2. Nicolas Faysse, 2005. "Coping With The Tragedy Of The Commons: Game Structure And Design Of Rules," Post-Print cirad-01002167, HAL.
    3. Jérémy Laurent-Lucchetti & Justin Leroux & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2011. "Splitting an Uncertain (Natural) Capital," Cahiers de recherche 1105, CIRPEE.
    4. Espínola-Arredondo, Ana & Muñoz-García, Félix, 2011. "Can incomplete information lead to under-exploitation in the commons?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 402-413.
    5. Polasky, Stephen & Bin, Okmyung, 2001. "Entry Deterrence and Signaling in a Nonrenewable Resource Model," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 235-256, November.
    6. Nicolas Faysse, 2005. "Coping with the Tragedy of the Commons: Game Structure and Design of Rules," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(2), pages 239-261, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cost asymmetries; Entry Deterrence; Signaling; Commons; Welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics

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