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Strategic Interaction and Institutional Quality Determinants of Environmental Regulations across Select OECD Countries

Author

Listed:
  • Gregmar Galinato
  • Hayley Chouinard

    (School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University)

Abstract

We provide a model of environmental regulation to control transboundary pollution while considering the role of neighboring country regulations and measures of the quality of own and neighboring country government institutions. We apply a Spatial Durbin model to identify the determinants of the environmental regulations of several OECD countries. We do not find evidence of strategic interaction as the regulations of a neighbor do not significantly impact the own country regulations. However, the higher the quality of government institutions in a country, the more stringent the implementation of regulations. Additionally, government institutional quality significantly positively impacts the stringency of regulations in neighboring countries indirectly, possibly through technology choices.

Suggested Citation

  • Gregmar Galinato & Hayley Chouinard, "undated". "Strategic Interaction and Institutional Quality Determinants of Environmental Regulations across Select OECD Countries," Working Papers 2014-7, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsu:wpaper:galinato-12
    as

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    File URL: http://faculty.ses.wsu.edu/WorkingPapers/Galinato/WP2014-7.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental regulations; institutions; spatial model; strategic interaction; spillovers;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics

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