Monopoly, Non-linear Pricing, and Imperfect Information : A Reconsideration of the Insurance Market
AbstractI reconsider Stiglitz's (1977) problem of monopolistic insurance with a continuum of types. Using a suitable transformation of control variables I obtain an analytical characterization of the optimal insurance policies. Closed form solutions and comparative statics results for special cases are provided.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 863.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
nonlinear pricing ; screening ; risk aversion;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-09-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2008-09-20 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-IAS-2008-09-20 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-IND-2008-09-20 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-UPT-2008-09-20 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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