Market Selection and Payout Policy Under Majority Rule
AbstractThe purpose of this paper is to explain how the choice between distributing cash through dividends or shares repurchases affects the firm’s ability to raise capital in the financial market. I assume investors have quadratic preferences over wealth but different prior beliefs about the likelihood a distribution takes place. At date zero agents purchase shares given their expectation about the firm’s payout method. At date 1 the firm announces whether the payout takes place that period. As in Brennan and Thakor , investors with different shareholdings have different incentives to gather information and, therefore, heterogeneous preferences about payout methods at date 1. I assume the firm adopts the payout method preferred by the majority of shareholders at date 1 under the one share/one vote rule. At date 2 the firm is liquidated and the remaining output is distributed among its shareholders. If at date zero agents disagree but not too much on the probability a distribution takes place, I show that a firm expected to pay dividends raises strictly more financial capital than an otherwise identical firm which is expected to repurchase shares. Therefore, a larger fraction of cash is distributed as dividend than through repurchases. One concludes that even in the presence of a small tax disadvantage financial markets favor dividend paying firms.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 814.
Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Market Selection Hypothesis ; Payout Policy ; Production under Incomplete Markets;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
- D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
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- Michael J. Brennan & Anjan V. Thakor, 2004.
"Shareholder Preferences and Dividend Policy,"
- Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, 1961. "Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34, pages 411.
- Allen, Franklin & Michaely, Roni, 2003.
Handbook of the Economics of Finance,
in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 337-429
- CRES, Herve, 2000. "Majority stable production equilibria : a multivariate mean shareholders theorem," Les Cahiers de Recherche 706, HEC Paris.
- DeMarzo, Peter M, 1993. "Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 713-34, July.
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