In a simple finite-horizon overlapping-generations model where the government has the power to levy commodity taxes and to implement uniform lump-sum transfers, and individuals as well as the government can purchase units of a storable good in order to transfer resources from the present to the future, we derive the equations that implicitly define the taxes and subsidies that are part of the second-best Pareto optima. In this context we first show that there is production efficiency. We then show that taxes on capital income/savings are required at almost all Pareto optima. Finally we show that there are no restriction on preferences or technologies that are consistent with a general exemption of capital income/savings from the tax base.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics D91 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
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Bernheim, B. Douglas, 2002.
"Taxation and saving,"
Handbook of Public Economics,
in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 18, pages 1173-1249
Elsevier.
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Auerbach, Alan J. & Hines, James Jr., 2002.
"Taxation and economic efficiency,"
Handbook of Public Economics,
in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 21, pages 1347-1421
Elsevier.
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Juergen Jung, 2008.
"The Timing of Redistribution,"
Caepr Working Papers
2008-015, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
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