Time-Inconsistent Candidates vs. Time-Inconsistent Voters : Imperfect Policy Commitment in Political Equilibrium
AbstractThis paper examines whether policy commitment mechanisms, when available, will be used by the elected policymaker in a political-economy equilibrium. We describe a two period repeated voting model where second-period outcomes depend on commitment choices made by an elected policymaker in the first period, and where elected candidates may choose to deviate from their preferred level of commitment, retaining discretionary control of policy variables, in order to secure a favourable second-period political outcome. The implications of different political tenure systems for the candidates who are elected, the policy targets that are selected, the degree of commitment to their implementation, and the policies that are actually implemented in the model are examined.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 544.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Dynamically Consistent Choices ; Policy Commitment ; Voting;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- D9 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1998. "Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 139-56, March.
- Crémer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas, 1994.
"In or Out?: Centralization by Majority Vote,"
IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Ãconomie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse
33, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Cremer, J. & Palfrey, T.R., 1994. "In or Out?: Centralization by Majority Vote," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ 94.335, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Cremer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas R., . "In or Out?: Centralization by Majority Vote," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 879, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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