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Voting for Taxes and Tax Incentives for Giving

Author

Listed:
  • Scharf, K.A.

Abstract

We describe a fiscal choice model where individuals vote over levels of proportional income taxation and over tax incentives for giving, and investigate how tax incentives for giving affect political equilibrium outcomes. We show that the availability of tax incentives can cause a regime switch and induce a low income policymaker to select a private provision regime over a pure public provision regime even when the median voter is a donor.

Suggested Citation

  • Scharf, K.A., 1997. "Voting for Taxes and Tax Incentives for Giving," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 497, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:497
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    File URL: https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/1995-1998/twerp497.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    TAXES ; PUBLIC GOODS ; INCENTIVES;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods

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