Voting for Taxes and Tax Incentives for Giving
AbstractWe describe a fiscal choice model where individuals vote over levels of proportional income taxation and over tax incentives for giving, and investigate how tax incentives for giving affect political equilibrium outcomes. We show that the availability of tax incentives can cause a regime switch and induce a low income policymaker to select a private provision regime over a pure public provision regime even when the median voter is a donor.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 497.
Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
TAXES ; PUBLIC GOODS ; INCENTIVES;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
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