Job Search and the Firm's Wage Offer Decisions : A Model of Null Offers
AbstractIn this paper a model of a profit maximising firm's responses to job search is developed. This model explains the determinants of a firm's wage offer and the probability that a firm will be found in a state where it is optimal to make no offer (i.e. a 'null' offer). Comparative statics results for the case of constant returns technology are calculated and the implications of the model for a market chatacterised by search are discussed.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 223.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 1982
Date of revision:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Helen Neal).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.