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Rent Control Evasion: Effects on Income and Deadweight Loss

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  • Filip Palda

    (Ecole nationale d'administration publique in Montreal)

Abstract

When ability to avoid rent control is randomly distributed over landlords, housing may rise above its free market level. Landlords evading part of rent-control are like suppliers selling to a perfectly price-discriminating monopsonist. A continuum of evasive abilities gives a range of low rent landlords, charging different prices and to whom tenants flock. High housing supply comes at the expense of deadweight loss due to adverse selection of landlords with high costs and good evasive abilities.Rent-control produces an equilibrium {\em range} of rents and raises what some tenants pay above that which they would pay in an unregulated market.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/urb/papers/0112/0112001.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Urban/Regional with number 0112001.

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Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 05 Dec 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpur:0112001

Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on HP/PostScript; pages: 38; figures: included. PDF document may be viewed or printed.
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Web page: http://128.118.178.162

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Keywords: rent control; informal sector; deadweight loss;

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  1. Arnott, Richard & Davidson, Russell & Pines, David, 1983. "Housing Quality, Maintenance and Rehabilitation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 467-94, July.
  2. Edward L. Glaeser & Erzo F. P. Luttmer, 2003. "The Misallocation of Housing Under Rent Control," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1027-1046, September.
  3. Raymon, Neil, 1983. "Price ceilings in competitive markets with variable quality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 257-264, November.
  4. Loikkanen, Heikki A, 1985. " On Availability Discrimination under Rent Control," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 87(3), pages 500-520.
  5. Browning, Edgar K & Culbertson, William Patton, Jr, 1974. "A Theory of Black Markets under Price Control: Competition and Monopoly," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 12(2), pages 175-89, June.
  6. Richard Arnott, 1995. "Time for Revisionism on Rent Control?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 99-120, Winter.
  7. Gyourko, Joseph & Linneman, Peter, 1989. "Equity and efficiency aspects of rent control: An empirical study of New York City," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 54-74, July.
  8. Olsen, Edgar O, 1972. "An Econometric Analysis of Rent Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(6), pages 1081-1100, Nov.-Dec..
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